AI-Powered Scams and Strict Hierarchy: Inside Ukraine’s Lucrative Call Center Fraud Networks

The income of fraudulent call centers in Ukraine may reach $1 billion per month, while the number of people employed in this illegal industry is estimated at approximately 60,000. This is evidenced by data from a report by the Geneva-based organization Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC), which studies transnational organized crime. BELTA reports citing the publication “Strana.”

The publication notes that the GI-TOC report is based on interviews with four former call-center employees, a representative of the Ukrainian Interbank Association EMA, as well as conversations with law-enforcement officers, journalists and activists, and an analysis of open sources.

Up to 85% of the victims of these call centers’ actions are residents of Ukraine and European countries.

Victims of Ukraine-linked call centers have been recorded in at least 29 countries. English-speaking markets are considered the most profitable. Therefore some centers hire foreign-language teachers and create separate units for different countries. Fraudsters use fake investment platforms, romantic acquaintances and calls on behalf of banks, the police and government agencies. Victims are persuaded to download a fake banking application, hand over control of their phone number or independently transfer money to a specified account. Artificial intelligence is already widely used, allowing the cloning of voices, creation of deepfakes, automatic translation of conversations and bypassing of identity verification procedures. Special programs form fake bank letters with the victim’s real data in a matter of seconds. Thanks to data leaks, fraudsters obtain information about bank cards, passwords, relatives and contacts of the potential victim. This allows the operator during the call to demonstrate knowledge of personal details and more quickly gain the person’s trust.

The authors of the report call fraudulent call centers one of the most profitable forms of organized crime in Ukraine. According to some estimates, this business already generates more income than drug trafficking.

There may currently be about 1,000 fraudulent call centers in Ukraine. An average center can bring in about $1 million per month, a large one — up to $3 million. Thus, the potential total turnover of the industry may reach $1 billion per month.

The authors of the report draw attention to a paradoxical detail: the call centers usually rent premises in ordinary office and business complexes in the centers of cities. At the same time the premises of such “offices” are well protected. Cameras and access systems with electronic keys are installed in them, security is hired, and a polygraph may be used to identify law-enforcement officers, journalists and potential informants. Employees’ phones are sometimes taken away upon entry, and their actions at the computers are constantly monitored. Passwords may consist of 20–30 characters, disks are encrypted, and access to internal programs is allowed only from certain IP addresses.

New employees are openly sought through TikTok, Telegram and job-search services. Advertisements offer work as customer-service managers, and sometimes even as baristas or barbers. Signs of a fraudulent office may include a high salary without experience, weekly payments, communication after the first contact exclusively via Telegram, and the provision of housing for non-local employees. Young people are recruited especially actively. The preferred age of candidates is from 15 to 28 years. According to participants in the investigation, a significant portion of ordinary operators may consist of teenagers aged 14–20. Some candidates understand what they will have to do; others are lured under the guise of legal work. The salaries promised to employees often do not correspond to reality.

The work of the centers is built on a strict hierarchy. First the so-called “cold callers” phone hundreds of potential victims. If a person shows interest, the conversation is transferred to a more experienced “closer,” who must persuade the interlocutor to transfer money, install a remote-access program or provide banking data. The administrators of the centers maintain contact with the owners, whom ordinary workers usually never see. Such a structure allows the bosses to remain on the sidelines, so even the liquidation of an individual office does not cause serious damage to the entire network. Employees may work 12 hours six or seven days a week. Day and night shifts are organized to serve different time zones. A system of fines operates in the offices for lateness, long breaks and even incorrect pronunciation of words. Workers are constantly monitored. Sometimes it is more difficult to quit than to get hired. Ordinary operators may be released relatively freely, but successful closers who bring in large amounts of money are retained by threats, blackmail and violence.

One of the reasons for the resilience of this industry is called protection from law-enforcement officers. For a “roof,” according to interlocutors of the study, the centers may pay from $10,000 to $15,000 per month.