Hormuz Is Not the Real Threat — The World Economy’s True Bottleneck Lies Elsewhere

Everyone has a phone in their hand and keeps refreshing the news feed. Instant global information was supposed to make markets more efficient. Instead it has made us more anxious at work. We procrastinate under the pretext that the next headline might change our lives.
If it is that important, let’s look briefly at what is actually happening in the world economy. Should we worry, and what can be done about it? How dependent is the global economy on trade bottlenecks? Would closing the Strait of Hormuz trigger a new world crisis? And what does it mean for Belarus?
Start with global logistics. Only the most uninformed person has not heard about the Strait of Hormuz in recent months. In reality it is not the only narrow point, and the world will not simply stop if it is blocked. Global logistics has a term for these places: chokepoints — geographic nodes that cannot be bypassed without enormous losses of time and money.
Eighty percent of world trade moves by sea. Ships follow three main routes.
The first is the trans-Pacific route — 5–7 percent of world trade between Asia and North America. The U.S. West Coast is open; deliveries to the East Coast and Latin America depend on the Panama Canal. That is why Trump made control of the canal a priority. The alternative — going the long way via the Indian and Atlantic oceans — is extremely expensive and requires far more ships and fuel that do not exist overnight.
The second is the trans-Atlantic route between America and Europe. No serious chokepoints, no major trade risks.
The third, and most important, is the Europe–Asia route, which carries more than 40 percent of world trade. It has four narrow points: the Suez Canal (paralyzed for two weeks a few years ago by a single grounded ship), the Bab el-Mandeb Strait (once pirate waters, now Houthi territory), the Strait of Gibraltar, and the Strait of Malacca. The last one alone handles 25 percent of global trade and is controlled by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. All of China’s, South Korea’s, and Japan’s trade with India, the Middle East, and Europe passes through it.
Where does Hormuz fit? It is not critical for overall world trade volume, but it is vital for specific commodities. It is a narrow corridor connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean — only 39 km at its tightest point, with shipping lanes just 3 km wide in each direction. In normal times roughly 20 million barrels of oil and products pass through it every day — about 25 percent of seaborne oil trade. It is also the main gateway for liquefied natural gas; Qatar alone supplies nearly 20 percent of global LNG.
Closing it drives energy prices up. But behind the oil headlines lie price spikes in far more important goods. Hormuz is a key artery for elemental sulfur, sulfuric acid, urea, and phosphorus. A blockade hits not just European gas stations but every plate on Earth.
First invisible monopoly: elemental sulfur and sulfuric acid. Persian Gulf countries account for about 25 percent of world sulfur production and 45 percent of seaborne trade in it. More than 98 percent of sulfur is a by-product of gas and oil processing, so supply is completely inelastic — you cannot quickly open a new mine. During the 2026 blockade sulfur shipments from the region collapsed 90 percent and prices jumped from $40–50 to $1,000–1,200 per ton. Sulfuric acid is the foundation of phosphate fertilizers. Its share in production costs soared from 30–35 percent to 130 percent, destroying margins and shutting chemical plants worldwide.
Second monopoly: nitrogen fertilizers — mainly urea and ammonia made from cheap natural gas. Gulf countries control over 36 percent of world urea exports and nearly 29 percent of anhydrous ammonia. Qatar, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are major food donors to the planet. Under blockade urea prices in world ports jumped 25–30 percent. India, which buys more than 40 percent of its urea from the Gulf, and Australia, more than 50 percent dependent, faced acute shortages.
Third: phosphorus. The Middle East produces about 20 percent of world phosphate fertilizers. A Hormuz blockade cuts physical supply and simultaneously deprives other producers of the sulfuric acid needed to process it. This is not a classic energy crisis. It is a systemic blow to the global food system. If oil is the blood of transport, sulfur, phosphorus, and urea are the bread that feeds the planet. Without them yields of key crops could fall by a third, creating a real risk of global hunger.
The numbers are frightening — oil, gas, food. It feels like time to stockpile. That is a cognitive error. High oil prices do not automatically crash the world economy. Between 2011 and 2013 oil stayed above $100 a barrel (about $130 in today’s money). The world did not collapse. The global economy grew at an accelerated pace and China enjoyed its industrial golden age.
Modern economies are far less oil-intensive. The share of pure energy cost in high-tech goods, services, and even modern machinery keeps falling. Expensive oil also generates new GDP: through massive investment in alternative pipelines and terminals that bypass Hormuz, and through higher revenues for exporter countries that modernize their own industries and raise domestic consumption. A $10–15 rise in oil adds at most 1 percent to inflation in the U.S. or Europe — a statistical blip for their systems, not a death sentence.
The same applies to sulfur and fertilizers. The world saw these prices in 2008 and 2020. Supply simply shifts to other producers who temporarily enjoy windfall profits. That is why large investors, funds, and elite traders remain calm. There is no panic crash on the exchanges. Professionals look at actual inventories, storage levels, and room for maneuver. Their coolness shows the situation is milder than the clickbait suggests. So stop constantly refreshing the news.
Most analysts look for crisis signals in the wrong place — physical shortages or drones hitting terminals. Real crises never arrive from outside. They are born inside the financial system itself.
Tanker explosions will not crash markets if the capital-exchange mechanism still works. The world financial system has learned to breathe. The true threat is not in the Middle East. It lives in the offices of the U.S. Federal Reserve and the major global banks. That is where the real time bomb sits. In the fight against inflation they raised interest rates to record levels. The era of cheap money is over, yet the enormous debt overhang remains. U.S. federal debt has already surpassed $35 trillion. Interest payments alone exceed $1 trillion a year.
This colossal internal credit bubble and the cost of servicing government borrowing set the true crisis cycles. A geopolitical shock in Hormuz can act as the needle that pricks the inflated debt balloon. But a regional conflict by itself cannot zero out the world economic system. No one knows exactly what the trigger will be or when it will come. Every global crisis is unique; there is no universal prevention recipe. The root cause lies in the nature of capitalism and human psychology.
Economies move in waves: expansion, peak, contraction, trough. In the upswing everyone is optimistic, invests, and produces too much. Eventually overproduction hits, demand falls, and the market clears itself through crisis. Second is crowd psychology: greed on the way up, panic selling on the way down. Banks amplify both emotions with credit.
While ordinary people watch every tanker movement in Hormuz, the real problems grow elsewhere. Geopolitics is a convenient screen onto which the consequences of domestic financial mistakes can be projected. If something goes wrong, Iranian drones or closed channels will be blamed. In reality crises are usually born not from a shortage of barrels but from errors in the financial markets.
How does this affect Belarus, and what can be done to minimize the impact? Look at the 2008–2009 crisis. It began as a pure financial failure — the U.S. mortgage bubble. Western banks froze and the Fed hesitated; the crisis became systemic. Credit stopped, enterprises ran short of working capital, global demand for metals, chemicals, oil products, and machinery collapsed, and real production halted worldwide.
Belarus, an open export-oriented economy, took the full hit. Demand for its key goods evaporated. Traditional partners in Russia had no free cash. The trade balance deteriorated rapidly and the Belarusian ruble was devalued by more than 20 percent in early 2009.
What protective mechanisms exist now?
First, the financial sector has undergone deep structural change. Dollar dependence has been sharply reduced. Loans, deposits, and settlements no longer hinge on the dollar the way they did in 2008. Western sanctions, paradoxically, forced the creation of tools to withstand external financial shocks.
Second, the level of financial strength is fundamentally different. In 2008 gold and foreign-exchange reserves were critically low. Today they stand at a stable $14–15 billion — a solid safety buffer covering more than three months of imports, fully meeting international reliability standards.
Third, a flexible exchange rate. The dollar rate is no longer treated as the main measure of stability. The priority is low inflation, kept near 5 percent by monetary policy. Affordable prices in the stores are the real benchmark of economic policy.
Belarus is therefore far better prepared for external challenges than in 2008. This is not bravado. The financial system is resilient because risks are assessed honestly. Sometimes that requires difficult decisions, such as adjusting interest rates. But independent expertise at the National Bank keeps reserves secure and inflation under control.
The simple advice is this: put the phone down and stop refreshing the alarming news feeds every minute. Yes, the world has physical chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz. But the most dangerous bottleneck of the modern era is the total dependence of global trade on the dollar. Any internal failure in that overblown credit machine inevitably generates world crises that are the direct result of its own flaws. Belarus has learned the lesson well, steadily building its sovereign contour and clearing the economy of foreign currency.







